planification Linguee

Because family shareholders are, where applicable, the primary beneficiaries of tax planning and the opportunistic behavior that may accompany it, these would be the subject of suspicion on the part of minority shareholders – outside the family. . The latter would also be led to “protect” themselves from these opportunistic behaviors, which would result in a discount applied to the price of the company's shares. In order to avoid – or at least limit – a fall in share prices that is costly for them, family shareholders would therefore be encouraged to send a signal of good management to investors by renouncing tax planning [3  ]planification fiscale [3] It should be noted that family shareholders are also.... Chen et al. (2010) also show that family businesses wishing to obtain external financing display an even lower “fiscal aggressiveness”. These different elements seem to indicate that tax planning is perceived negatively by shareholders, and even by all of the company's financial partners. 13As a result, tax planning would not necessarily be “valued” by shareholders. Desai et al.(2007) even noted that at a given tax rate, greater rigor in the application of tax provisions by the authorities could lead to an increase in the stock market value of a company. This conclusion is drawn from the Russian experience; as the authors point out, Vladimir Putin's accession to power in 2000 was accompanied by the implementation of a plan to combat tax evasion, followed by an increase in the value of corporate shares subject to administrative control – such as the oil company Sibneft, now known as Gazprom Neft. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is attributed to the fact that the penalization of the tax practices of these companies has made it possible to put an end to the diversion of profits carried out by the majority shareholders to the detriment of the minority shareholders. Indeed, the arrangements used in the context of tax planning also generally made it possible to subtract income.